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The House of Lords: The Working of the 
Electoral Process in the 1999 Act of Parliament 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 
TOMILA LANKINA AND MICHAEL PHILLIPS 
 
 
 
The purpose of what follows is to investigate the working of the 1999 Act of 
Parliament in relation to the electoral process put in place for the purpose of 
maintaining the representation of the hereditary element in the House of Lords.  After 
nearly ten years it is good time to assess the consequences of this process, as this was 
one of the controversial measures in the 1999 Act.   In the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 
Sessions of Parliament Lord Avebury introduced House of Lords (Amendment) Bills 
to repeal this electoral process.  Both Bills received second readings after the issues 
were debated.  Also in the 2007-2008 Session Lord (David) Steel of Aikwood 
introduced the House of Lords Bill, which included a second Part which covered the 
same measure as Lord Avebury’s Bill.  This House of Lords Bill has also received a 
second reading and had one session in the Committee stage.   So the working of this 
electoral process is likely to be a topic of debate in the current 2008-2009 Session of 
the House of Lords.  We suggest that there are three possible options to deal with the 
present and likely future issues for this electoral process.  These we present as a 
contribution to a wider debate on the way forward for this constitutional issue. 
 
 
An acceptable second chamber 
 
The New Labour Government led by Tony Blair came to power in 1997 with a 
mandate to reform the House of Lords.  As there was no firm idea of how the 
reformed House of Lords would be constituted the first stage was to create a 
‘transitional’ chamber.  There was a desire by some in the Government to exclude all 
hereditary peers from the Chamber but political considerations prevailed.  As a result 
of a deal negotiated by the then Leader of the Conservative peers, Lord Cranborne, 92 
peers were allowed to remain in the transitional chamber, and elections took place for 
the 90 elected places1.  This resulted in a group of peers who reflected well the 
composition of the hereditary peerage, in terms of the origin and date of the titles held 
in 19992.   But the question was how to maintain this representation.  Many Labour 
supporters would have been happy to see this representation eroded over the years by 
the natural process of death.  However the hereditary peers managed to insert an 
electoral process into the 1999 Act, to ensure the number of hereditary peers remained 
at 92.  
Thus a mixed second chamber has persisted as proposed by the 1999 Act with the 90 
elected hereditary peers representing the historic hereditary peerage and the remaining 
directly appointed Life Peers.  Though such a solution to the composition of the 
second chamber has found favour, it was also pointed out at the time that there were 
problems with this arrangement3.  Firstly there was no advance towards making the 
second chamber more democratic.  Secondly it did not fulfil the Labour Party’s 
manifesto commitment to remove the hereditary element entirely from the House of 
Lords.  Thirdly there was the problem of how each of the selected 92 peers would be 
replaced after death.  This third problem is the one we wish to consider in this article. 
Consideration of the second stage of reform was given to a Royal Commission, 
chaired by Lord Wakeham. This commission was much preoccupied with the 
legitimacy of any reformed second chamber.  The Royal Commission concluded that 
whilst elections to this chamber could result in too much legitimacy, public support 
for the chamber could be substantially increased by other means4.  However no 
further reform has taken place and the House of Lords remains in 2008 in the 
transitional state as set up in 1999.  Perhaps this is because soon after the transitional 
status had been achieved it was realised that this transitional status had achieved the 
desired aims of the reform5.  So de facto, the current status (and consequent 
replacement electoral process for hereditary peers) of the second chamber has become 
acceptable to many over these nine years. 
 
 
The working of the electoral process  
 
Before the question of the appropriateness of the electoral process is considered, a few 
remarks on how this works are in order.  There were 75 Political Party choices which 
were made in proportion to the numbers in the hereditary peerage in 1999.  Hence 42 
Conservative, 28 Cross-bench, 3 Liberal Democrat and 2 Labour members of the 
hereditary peerage were elected by the hereditary Peers and Peeresses of these Parties 
in 1999.  Also 15 Elected Office Holders were chosen.  The original elections were 
conducted in October and November 1999 using the Alternative Vote electoral 
system.   The results were announced on Friday 5th November for the 75 Political 
Party choices, before the end of the session on Thursday 11th November.  This session 
terminated the membership of the unelected hereditary peers and peeresses.   The 15 
Elected Office Holders had been chosen the week before. This election process 
worked well in reflecting the composition of the hereditary peerage. 
How were these peers (and peeresses) to be replaced in the event of death?  Obviously 
not by the natural inheritance process that had been traditionally used.  In what 
reflected a belief that this transitional chamber would not last long, it was agreed that 
the 1999 election results would be used, if required before the next general election, 
which occurred in 2001.  So the best two runners-up (Lord Cobbold and Lord 
Chorley) joined the Cross-benchers in 2000 and 2001.   This method of replacement 
had the advantages of being both the simplest and also least controversial as these 
runners-up, who had missed election originally by a few votes, had the most right to 
represent the hereditary peerage.   However it could not persist as the rights of new 
holders of peerages, as they succeeded to hereditary peerages, would be ignored.  
Also those who had stood in the original 1999 election would grow old and die. 
We now consider developments after the 2001 general election.  The first replacement 
occurred without an election when the Duke of Norfolk succeeded his deceased father 
in 2002 as a Hereditary Office Holder.  The first by-election that was required was as 
the result of the death of the Conservative Viscount of Oxfuird in 2003.  As he was 
one of the 15 Elected Office Holders the electorate for this by-election was the whole 
of the House of Lords (of more than 600 members).  This event highlighted the 
consequences of the 1999 Act, and resulted in much adverse comment from Labour 
Peers. The result of this by-election was the election of Viscount Ullswater, a 
Conservative, who thus replaced another Conservative peer. A similar by-election for 
the Elected Office Holders occurred in 2005 when Viscount Eccles, a Conservative, 
replaced the Conservative Lord Aberdare.  This explains what has happened for the 
15 Elected Office Holders since 2001.  These two and all other by-elections used the 
Alternative Vote electoral system.   
With regard to the other 75 Political Party choices it was decided to freeze the 
political composition of the hereditary peerage as it stood in 1999.  So members of the 
four political groups would replace themselves with members of the same political 
persuasion.  These groups were of vastly different sizes with the Conservatives taking 
the majority (42) of the 75 places compared to Labour, the smallest group, with only 2 
places.  Not surprisingly the most Party by-elections have been for the Conservatives 
with three by-elections to 2008.   Next has been the other large group (28) of Cross-
Benchers with two by-elections.   Despite the small numbers there have been by-
elections for both the small groups (3 and 2 respectively) of Liberal and Labour peers.   
The electorates for each of these by-elections were the hereditary peers elected to the 
House of Lords belonging to the four groups to be replaced.  If the electorate had 
simply been drawn from the 75 Political Party choices this would have resulted in the 
situation at the death in 2003 of Lord Milner of Leeds of the only remaining Labour 
peer (Lord Rea) having the right to decide who should join him!  Hence it was 
decided that the electorate should be drawn from the whole body of the 90 elected 
hereditary peers, including the 15 Elected Office Holders.  This increased the Labour 
by-election electorate to three by the addition of Viscount Simon and Lord Strabolgi, 
who elected Lord Grantchester from the 11 candidates, who put themselves forward 
for election.  It was a similar situation when Bertrand Russell’s son Conrad died in 
2004 and the Liberal Democrat electorate of four elected the Earl of Glasgow, though 
there were only three candidates.  As these by-elections were such small affairs they 
attracted less attention than those for the Elected Office Holders which included an 
electorate of all (over 600) of the members of the House of Lords. 
The electorates for the three by-elections for the Conservative Political Party 
hereditary peers elected to the House were much larger.  These by-elections had 
electorates of 47 peers and attracted about 40 candidates each time.  Hence it was not 
the case as with the Labour Party that the candidates exceeded the electorate. These 
by-elections demonstrated the effect of the Alternative Vote electoral system (as 
opposed to the First Past the Post system) as the candidate with the most first 
preference votes did not necessarily win the by-election.     
For the other large group of Cross-Benchers there have been two by-elections 
including the most recent one in May 2008.   These by-elections had electorates of 29 
peers and attracted about 30 candidates each time, having numbers of candidates and 
members of the electorate comparable as in the case of the Conservatives.  This latest 
by-election demonstrates that the desire to have a seat in the House of Lords has not 
diminished as the numbers of candidates had increased from 26 in 2005 to 33 in 2008.   
There have been a total of nine by-elections in the period from 2002 to 2008 of which 
only two have involved the whole (over 600) members of the House of Lords.  Apart 
from these two Elected Office Holder by-elections the remaining seven by-elections 
have been low-key affairs and have attracted little public notice.  In fact the most 
recent election in May 2008 of the Earl of Stair (a cousin of the Queen) to the Cross-
Benches seemed to go unreported in the Press.  It occurred at the time of the much 
more newsworthy event of the Conservative victory in the Crewe and Nantwich 
House of Commons by-election. 
 
 
 
Is the electoral process acceptable to the interested parties? 
 
In order to consider whether this process is acceptable, and therefore there is no great 
urgency to change the present arrangements, it is necessary to decide who has an 
interest in answering this question.   The first group with an interest is the hereditary 
peerage.  They may conclude that the House of Lords reform has reflected and 
enhanced the negotiating skill of their leaders in that they ensured the inclusion of this 
electoral process in the 1999 Act and the continued presence of the hereditary peerage 
in the House of Lords to maintain the integrity of the second chamber.   
The Labour Government in 1997 had a mandate to reform the House of Lords.  So far 
the progress made in this reform has included the creation of the first stage of a 
‘transitional’ chamber.  This first stage did not exclude all hereditary peers from the 
Chamber although it did succeed in excluding the majority.   This had the effect of 
ending the inbuilt Conservative advantage.  The result has been a House of Lords with 
no party or group with an overall majority.  In fact the Labour, Conservative and 
Cross-Bench groups have rough parity (of about 200 peers)6.  The breaking of the 
Conservative majority in the House of Lords was probably one of the main stimulants 
to changing the composition of the House of Lords.  As this has been achieved, the 
present Labour Government of Gordon Brown is likely to be satisfied to accept the 
present arrangement.  This was confirmed at the second reading of Lord Avebury’s 
Bill in February 2008 by the Government spokesman Lord Hunt of Kings Heath.   
The Government wishes to wait for a White Paper on the second stage of reform and 
is not prepared to support any change in the 1999 Act till then. 
Another effect of the 1999 Act was to exclude many Conservative supporters, who 
were hereditary peers, from politics at Westminster. However the Conservative 
leadership in the House of Lords managed to resist their complete exclusion.  The 
Conservatives managed to obtain the majority of the 90 places.   Though this 
arrangement was not universally welcomed by the then Conservative leadership the 
Conservatives were generally content with the deal as the most realistic one that was 
on offer7.  With the change of the Conservative Party leadership from William Hague 
to David Cameron it is unlikely that this present leadership would see the reform of 
the House of Lords as a major priority of any new Conservative government.  This is 
because with the Conservative peers still in 2008 one of the largest groups in the 
House of Lords the Conservative leadership will feel that the House of Lords should 
be no major obstacle to the policies of a Conservative government as was the case 
with the Blair Labour government. 
It has been suggested that the biggest winners in the ‘transitional’ chamber have been 
the Liberal Democrats8.   Though only a third of the size of the three main groups it is 
more organised than the large Cross-Bench group. It boasts a common purpose rather 
than being a group of peers who belong together only because they do not want to 
belong to any other group.   The sponsors, Lord Avebury and Lord Steel of Aikwood, 
of both the Bills before the House of Lords in the 2007-2008 Session to abolish 
hereditary peerage by-elections were Liberal Democrat peers. It is not clear that their 
views represent that of their party.  Though the present arrangement is unlikely to 
conform to Liberal Democrat policy, others are probably likely to admit in private that 
they can live with the present arrangement of the composition of the House of Lords 
and the use of by-elections. 
From the point of view of the general electorate, the implications of the reform are not 
very substantial.  The electorate’s interest in issues tends to depend on the current 
economic or international climates. It is doubtful that the composition of the second 
chamber comes high up in the priorities of the average member of the electorate.   
Given the ignorance of the general population about those who sit in the House of 
Lords or who held hereditary peerages, this is not surprising.  
 
Consequences of the electoral process 
 
In outlining the working of the electoral process we have highlighted some of the 
consequences.  Now we go into a little more detail about the effects of the working of 
the 1999 Act which might not have been foreseen. 
The first is connected with gender.  The hereditary peerage was basically a male caste.   
Until 1958 there were no female members of the House of Lords, hence the reason for 
its name.  Even prior to that however there were some female members of the 
hereditary peerage, but they were barred from entering the House of Lords.   Though 
still few, at the time of the 1999 Act there were 17 female peeresses, holders of 
hereditary peerages. Since 1963, they had the right to a seat in the House of Lords.   
At the election of hereditary peers in 1999 the peeresses had been very successful 
managing to get five (29%) elected to the 90 places available.  Four of them sat as 
Cross-Benchers and the Countess of Mar was elected as an Elected Office Holder. 
Three of the female Cross-Benchers have died over the last ten years and have been 
replaced by peers.  Thus their numbers in the elected hereditary peerage have fallen 
by 60%.  Of course, their present representation (of just over 2%) does reflect their 
proportion in the overall hereditary peerage.   But what has happened as a result of 
these by-elections probably highlights why a peeress like Lady Strange would have 
little chance of winning a by-election9.  In fact no peeresses have stood for election to 
the House of Lords since 1999. 
The second unforeseen consequence was what appears to be the enthusiasm of the 
Scottish peerage to participate in the politics of Westminster.  The Scottish peerage is 
one of the historic components of the hereditary peerage.  It accounted for 11% of the 
hereditary peerage in 1999 and managed to be elected to 13 (14%) of the 90 places 
available.  So it was slightly more favourably represented than would have been 
expected.  In the last ten years one Scottish peer has died and three of the nine peers 
elected have been Scottish peers, a net gain of two.  The Scottish peerage now has 15 
(17%) of the 90 places available.   Though this is hardly a major constitutional issue, 
it is interesting.  So amongst some Scots there seems to be a stronger desire to 
participate in the political institutions of the United Kingdom than one would be led to 
believe if you listened to the views on the Union propagated by their First Minister 
Alex Salmond. 
A third consequence of the electoral process is that new peers, who have succeeded to 
their hereditary peerages since 1999 could be elected.  At first when it was thought 
that this transitional chamber would not last long, it was agreed that the runners-up in 
the 1999 election results would be used.  The measure was employed to compensate 
those who had just failed to be elected in 1999.  This continued to be the situation 
with near failures in the 1999 election being elected in the subsequent by-elections.   
The one exception to this was the election in 2005 of Lord De Mauley, who had 
succeeded his uncle in 2002, to replace one of the Conservative Political Party 
choices.   This demonstrated that it was possible for an outsider, with no previous 
experience of the House of Lords, to be elected in a by-election.    
 
 
 
What is the future of the electoral process? 
 
Where does the House of Lords go from here?  At the time of writing this article in 
2008 there have been twelve deaths (13%) of the original 92 peers and peeresses who 
were allowed to remain in the House of Lords after November 1999.  This has 
resulted in 9 by-elections, 2 involving the whole House of Lords and the other 7 Party 
Political by-elections involving different groups of elected hereditary peers acting as 
the electorate.  There was adverse comment from Labour peers in 2003 at the first by-
election of an Elected Office Holder, when Viscount Ullswater, a Conservative, was 
elected and the electorate for this by-election was the whole of the House of Lords.  
One disadvantage of the process is that it is forced to work with the allocation of Party 
Political choices that were determined by the 1999 political composition of the 
hereditary peerage.  There are consequences of the electoral process which may not 
have been foreseen, which we have outlined - gender balance, Scottish representation 
and the recruitment of new, younger members.  Another consequence that needs to be 
taken into consideration is the likely increase in the annual number of by-elections, 
because of the age structure of the present hereditary peers in the House of Lords. 
Lord Avebury admitted at the second reading of his Bill that he had taken no actuarial 
advice on this matter.  At the present time of writing (in 2008) by-elections are 
occurring at a rate of about one a year but we have made a simple actuarial calculation 
using life tables and this would suggest that the annual number of by-elections will 
rise rapidly to three over the next decade.     
What could be the options?  We suggest that there are three.  A first option is to stay 
with the present electoral process which involves using by-elections.  The advantages 
of this option are firstly that no legislative action has to be taken and secondly that the 
present composition of the hereditary peerage is maintained.  The disadvantages are 
firstly the consequences which we have outlined – lack of gender balance, Scottish 
representation and the recruitment of new, younger members and secondly the 
increase in the number of by-elections.  Though the Political Party choices involve 
small electorates (and hence are easily managed) the Elected Office Holders by-
elections involve all the members of the House of Lords and these would be likely to 
occur once every two years.   
A second option is to widen the electorate of the present electoral process for by-
elections to the whole House of Lords, which was suggested by Lord Desai during the 
debate on the second reading of Lord Avebury’s Bill.  The advantages of this option 
are firstly that candidates for by-elections for the Political Party choices would have 
to appeal to a wider constituency and secondly that this could be done by a simple 
amendment of the 1999 Act which would make the process more transparent and 
perhaps more acceptable to all parties in the House of Lords.  The disadvantages are 
firstly that by-elections involving all the members of the House of Lords would be 
likely to occur three times a year and secondly that the Conservatives might feel that 
they would be the losers in such an arrangement.  However when Elected Office 
Holders candidates were chosen by the whole House, in the two by-elections held so 
far (in 2003 and 2005), in both cases Conservatives were elected.  As stated above, as 
the Conservatives do not have a majority in the House of Lords, this would suggest 
that the replacements were chosen not simply for Party reasons but on merit.   
A third option is to go back to the original 1999 electoral process and have elections 
every Parliament and fill the vacancies that occur with runners-up as was done before 
the 2001 general election.  The advantages of this option are firstly ease of 
administration, as elections would only occur normally every four or five years, so 
there would be no need for by-elections and secondly that the political party 
composition of the hereditary peerage does not have to be frozen in the 1999 state.  
The disadvantages are firstly that this is a radical process involving some detailed 
revising of the 1999 Act and secondly this would raise the question of what the 
political party representation of the Political Party choices should be.   Should it 
represent the current political composition of the hereditary peerage or should it 
represent the current political composition of the House of Lords?  
What could be done?  The easiest option is to do nothing.  However this has 
consequences which may be considered undesirable by perpetuating an outdated 
system.  The simplest option, if anything could be done, is to keep by-elections and 
widen the electorate.  But the whole House of Lords may think this is too much of a 
burden to be involved in this three times a year.   The best option could be to have one 
election every general election.  This offers simplicity but at the price of renegotiating 
the rules. 
Is any of this practical? All the signs are that easiest option to do nothing will prevail.  
Both the Bills of Lord Steel of Aikwood and Lord Avebury attracted large numbers of 
amendments.  When Lord Steel of Aikwood’s Bill was debated in Committee for the 
first time only three amendments were considered.  Two of these were concerned with 
the name of the Second Chamber.  Rather than spending time debating this question 
Lord Strathclyde suggested that this could have been left to such constitutional 
experts as Vernon Bogdanor and Meg Russell to decide.  There seemed no interest, 
despite the pleadings of the sponsors, for members of the House of Lords to address 
the issue of the present working of the hereditary peerage by-election process.  The 
main aim of the article has been to highlight the present position and outline the 
possible options in the hope that this will lead to a more realistic debate on a practical 
way forward for this constitutional issue. 
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